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This paper theoretically and empirically analyzes the effect of strengthening intellectual property rights
in developing countries on the level and composition of industrial development.  We develop a North-South
product cycle model in which Northern innovation, Southern imitation, and FDI are all endogenous.
Our model predicts that IPR reform in the South leads to increased FDI in the North, as Northern
firms shift production to Southern affiliates.  This FDI accelerates Southern industrial development.
The South's share of global manufacturing and the pace at which production of recently invented goods
shifts to the South both increase.  Additionally, the model also predicts that as production shifts to
the South, Northern resources will be reallocated to R&D, driving an increase in the global rate of
innovation.  We test the model's predictions by analyzing responses of U.S.-based multinationals and
domestic industrial production to IPR reforms in the 1980s and 1990s.  First, we find that MNCs expand
the scale of their activities in reforming countries after IPR reform.  MNCs that make extensive use
of intellectual property disproportionately increase their use of inputs.  There is an overall expansion
of industrial activity after IPR reform, and highly disaggregated trade data indicate an increase in the
number of initial export episodes in response to reform.  These results suggest that the expansion of
multinational activity more than offsets any decline in the imitative activity of indigenous firms.
Lee Branstetter
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How do reforms aimed at strengthening intellectual property rights (IPR)
impact industrial development in reforming countries and in the global econ-
omy as a whole? On the one hand, e⁄ective enforcement of IPR confers
monopoly power on the creators of intellectual property, generating a static
welfare loss. In addition, opponents of IPR reform in developing countries
argue that stronger IP enforcement will hamper the ability of local ￿rms to
experiment with and assimilate advanced foreign technologies at low cost
and hence slow down the rate of global technological di⁄usion.1 By con-
trast, proponents of stronger IPR argue that it may actually enhance the
industrial development process in developing countries since the provision
of greater security for intellectual property in developing countries will en-
courage multinationals to shift production to such countries. This assumes
that the decline in indigenous imitative activity in developing countries that
institute IPR reforms can, in principle, be o⁄set by increased multinational
activity. Proponents also argue that stronger IPR enforcement in develop-
ing countries will lead to increased world wide innovation, bene￿tting con-
sumers everywhere. This paper seeks to illuminate this debate by modeling
and empirically testing the e⁄ects of increased Southern IPR protection on
Southern industrial development in a North-South product cycle model of
international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI).
Our model extends the work of Helpman (1993) and Lai (1998). Help-
man (1993) develops a two region (North-South) general equilibrium frame-
work in which all innovation takes place in the North, precluding any bene￿t
resulting from increased innovation in the South as a consequence of stronger
IPR.2 In Helpman￿ s model, stronger IPR in the South signi￿cantly retards
Southern industrial development. The South￿ s share of global manufac-
turing is lower in the strong IPR equilibrium, and the rate at which the
1 For example, a critic of stronger IPR enforcement in developing countries may argue
that the rapid postwar industrialization in East Asian countries such as Japan and South
Korea was achieved under relatively weak IPR regimes and that a premature imposition
of a strong IPR regime could retard the industrial development of today￿ s developing
countries. See Maskus (2000), who notes these arguments, and the overview and evidence
presented in Ordover (1991) and Maskus and McDaniel (1999). On South Korea, see
Westphal, Kim, and Dahlman (1985). For criticisms of strong IPR which stress static
welfare losses, see McCalman (2001) and Chaudhuri et al. (2006).
2Subsequent work has retained this assumption; to maximize continuity with this earlier
work, so do we. The empirical evidence that stronger IPR leads to signi￿cantly more
indigenous innovative activity is mixed at best. The results of Lerner (2002), Branstetter,
Fisman, and Foley (2006), Scherer and Weisburst (1995), and Sakakibara and Branstetter
(2001) all suggest weak e⁄ects.
1production of recently invented goods shifts to the South declines, worsen-
ing Southern terms of trade. Stronger IPR expands the North￿ s share of
global manufacturing ￿at the expense of the South ￿but causes the rate
of innovation in the North to decline in the long run, relative to the weak
IPR equilibrium, because more Northern resources are tied up in produc-
tion rather than innovation. Thus, the retardation of Southern industrial
development also leads to a decline in the rate of Northern innovation. Fur-
thermore, under Helpman￿ s assumptions, the negative e⁄ects of stronger
IPR on Southern industrial development and on the global rate of innova-
tion contribute to an overall negative welfare e⁄ect of stronger IPR on the
South. Even in the North, the decline in the rate of innovation can o⁄set
static welfare gains. Helpman￿ s analysis demonstrated that the e⁄ect of
stronger IPR on Southern industrial development is a crucial determinant
of its overall impact on the global economy.
We extend Helpman (1993) in two critical ways. First, we allow the level
of FDI in the South to respond endogenously to changes in the strength of
Southern IPR protection. As Lai (1998) has shown, allowing for this kind of
endogenous response can lead to a reversal of the prediction that stronger
IPR in the South retards Southern industrial development. Instead, North-
ern MNCs respond to stronger IPR in the South by shifting production to
their Southern a¢ liates, allowing for a reallocation of Northern resources
away from production and toward innovative activity. Although Southern
imitation declines, this decline is more than o⁄set by the increased activity
of multinational ￿rms. The share of global manufacturing undertaken in
the South expands and the pace at which production of recently invented
goods shifts to the South accelerates, leading to an overall enhancement of
Southern industrial development. Under this scenario, the global rate of in-
novation and new product introduction also increase, potentially generating
global welfare gains.
Second, like Grossman and Helpman (1991b), we treat imitation as a
costly activity and allow the level of imitative e⁄ort by Southern ￿rms to
be endogenously determined.3 Making both imitation and FDI endogenous
increases our model￿ s complexity, but allows us to make a contribution to
the development of richer North-South product cycle models of international
trade. More importantly, since imitation is indeed a costly activity in the
3Helpman (1993) encouraged the incorporation of this feature into models like his own.
He noted that ￿...imitation is an economic activity much the same as innovation; it requires
resources and it responds to economic incentives...￿and that ￿...in order to take account
of these considerations there is need for considerable extension of the models employed in
this paper.￿
2real world, analyses of IPR protection that treat it as exogenous fail to ac-
count for the fact that IPR reforms alter the global allocation of resources
among imitation and other economic activities. This resource reallocation
has welfare consequences for both the North and the South. In our model,
stronger IPR protection in the South slows down imitation, thereby freeing
up local resources that are utilized by multinational ￿rms, which are at-
tracted to the South in greater numbers due to a reduction in the Southern
risk of imitation. Even though stronger IPR protection results in fewer
imitated goods being produced in the South, overall Southern industrial
development is enhanced under reasonable parameterizations because the
increase in FDI from the North to the South more than o⁄sets the reduc-
tion in the extent of Southern imitation.
We confront the predictions of our model with a variety of empirical
tests that assess its validity as a descriptive tool. In order to investigate the
impact of IPR reform on multinational production in the South, we begin by
analyzing the response of U.S. multinationals to a series of well-documented
IPR reforms by sixteen countries in the 1980s and 1990s. Consistent with
the model, we ￿nd that U.S.-based multinationals expand the scale of their
activities in reforming countries after IPR reform. A¢ liates of parents that
make extensive use of intellectual property in countries that do not reform
disproportionately increase their physical capital, employment compensa-
tion, transfer of technology from abroad, and research and development
(R&D) expenditures. This evidence is consistent with U.S. multinationals
shifting production of more technologically intensive goods to a¢ liates in
response to reforms.
It is more di¢ cult to assess changes in the rate of imitation by indigenous
￿rms. Using U.N. industry-level data from reforming countries, we show that
industry-level value added increases after reforms, particularly in those in-
dustries that are technology-intensive and where U.S. FDI is concentrated.
Thus, it appears that increased multinational activity is su¢ ciently large
to o⁄set potential declines in imitative local activity, suggesting an overall
enhancement of Southern industrial development. This is important for
assessing the overall welfare impact of IPR reforms, since the theory argues
that increased Southern industrial development is a necessary condition for
reforms to be welfare improving. We obtain further indirect evidence on
the rate at which production of goods is transferred to reforming countries
by analyzing disaggregated U.S. import statistics. Following Feenstra and
Rose (2000), we construct for each reforming country an annual count of
￿initial export episodes￿ ￿the number of 10-digit commodities for which
recorded U.S. imports from a given country exceed zero for the ￿rst time.
3This is used as a rough indicator of the rate at which production of goods
shifts to the reforming countries, through a combination of multinational
production and indigenous imitation. This rate of production transfer in-
creases sharply after IPR reform, suggesting that any decline in indigenous
innovation is more than o⁄set by an expanded range of goods being pro-
duced through multinational a¢ liates. Again, the evidence suggests that
IPR reform enhances, rather than retards, Southern industrial development.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present our
theoretical model. Section 3 describes our data and presents our empirical
results. Section 4 concludes.
2 Theory
The North-South product cycle model we present here borrows from the
work of Grossman and Helpman (1991b), Helpman (1993), and Lai (1998),
but it also builds on this theoretical foundation in substantive ways. Our
primary goal is to derive the e⁄ect of an increase in Southern IPR protection
on Southern industrial development and the international allocation of pro-
duction when innovation, FDI, and imitation are all endogenous. To preview
our ￿ndings, we demonstrate that an increase in Southern IPR protection
leads to a decrease in Southern imitation but an increase in the degree to
which Northern multinationals shift production to their Southern a¢ liates.
Under a wide range of plausible parameter values, we can show that the
impact of the second e⁄ect on Southern industrialization dominates; on net,
stronger IPR accelerates the rate at which goods shift to the South and
expands the South￿ s share of global manufacturing. Thus, the model gen-
erates a set of clear, empirically testable hypotheses that can then be taken
to the data. Readers who are primarily interested in our empirical results
may wish to move to Section 3.
2.1 A North-South Model with FDI
There are two regions (North and South). Labor is the only factor of pro-
duction and region i￿ s labor endowment equals Li, i = N;S. As in Grossman
and Helpman (1991a), preferences are identical in the two regions and a rep-
resentative consumer chooses instantaneous expenditure E(￿) to maximize











e￿r(￿￿t)I(￿)d￿ + A(t) for all t (2)
where ￿ denotes the rate of time preference; r the nominal interest rate; I(￿)
instantaneous income; and A(t) the current value of assets. The instanta-








where x(j) denotes the consumption of good j; n the number of goods
available and 0 < ￿ < 1.
As is well known, under the above assumptions, the consumer￿ s opti-
mization problem can be broken down into two stages. First, he chooses
how to allocate a given spending level across all available goods. Second,
he chooses the optimal time path of spending. Equation (3) implies that
the elasticity of substitution between any two goods is constant and equals
" = 1

















= r ￿ ￿ (6)
Following Grossman and Helpman (1991b), if we normalize by E(t) = 1 for
all t then in steady state we have r(t) = ￿:
2.1.1 Product Market
Three types of ￿rms produce goods: Northern ￿rms (N), Northern multina-
tionals (M), and Southern imitators (S). Denote ￿rms by J where J = N;
M, or S. Northern ￿rms can either produce in the North or the South. A
￿rm needs one worker to produce a unit of output in the North, whereas
5￿ ￿ 1 workers per unit of output are needed in the South. Intuitively, this
is due to the costs of coordinating decisions over large distances and operat-
ing in relatively unfamiliar environments with which they are less familiar
relative to local ￿rms (see Markusen, 1995).
Given the demand function in (4), it is straightforward to show that








Southern ￿rms can produce only those goods that they have successfully
imitated and they need one worker to produce one unit of output. Let ￿
denote the rate of imitation (de￿ned in equation 17) and as in Lai (1998)
assume that imitation targets only Northern multinationals. As is known
from the work of Mans￿eld (1994) and Maskus (2000), multinational ￿rms
internalize the risk of imitation that they face due to weak IPR protection
in host countries. In our model, the risk faced by Northern ￿rms that do not
produce in the South has been normalized to zero.4 In reality, Northern ￿rms
that do not undertake FDI can also have their technologies imitated, but
the risk of imitation they face is probably lower than that of multinational
￿rms that produce in the South.
If successful in imitating a multinational, a Southern ￿rm engages in
price competition with the Northern multinational whose good it has copied
so that in equilibrium we have:
pS = ￿wS (8)
Note that limit pricing is optimal for a Southern imitator if and only if its
unconstrained monopoly price wS









When ￿￿ > 1, a Southern imitator charges the unconstrained monopoly
price wS
￿ : In what follows, we focus on the case where ￿￿ < 1.
Let xJ denote the output level of ￿rm J where J = N;M, or S. We









4This assumption is made for modeling convenience. We can relax this assumption,
allowing for a positive, ￿xed risk of imitation of Northern ￿rms, and our theoretical results
will still obtain.
6Using the pricing equations for the three types of products, we have
xS














Flow pro￿t of a Northern producer are given by




Similarly, a multinational￿ s ￿ ow pro￿t equals




while that of a Southern ￿rm equals
￿S = (￿wS ￿ wS)xS = (￿ ￿ 1)wSxS (15)
2.1.2 Innovation, Imitation, and FDI
Of the n goods that exist, nN are produced in the North, nM are produced
in the South by Northern multinationals, and nI are produced by Southern
imitators. Let nS ￿ nI + nM denote all goods produced in the South and






where nN denotes the number of goods produced in the North. In other
words, the stock of goods produced by multinational increases by ￿nN at






i.e. ￿ denotes the rate of increase of imitated goods relative to the total
number of goods produced by Northern multinationals. We can think of the
level of Southern industrial development as roughly corresponding to the
Southern share of global manufacturing; i.e., the ratio of goods produced in
7the South to the number of goods that exist at a point in time. Our con-
cept of industrial development explicitly includes the activities of Northern
a¢ liates. The advance of Southern industrial development will obviously
depend on the rate of FDI and the rate of imitation. Like Lai (1998), we



























































A successful Northern innovator has the option of producing either in
the North or in the South. While it is cheaper to produce in the South (as
we show below, the Southern relative wage is lower in equilibrium), shifting
production to the South invites the risk of imitation. The lifetime value of





while that of one that chooses to become a multinational equals
vM =
￿M
￿ + ￿ + g
(22)
Since all Northern ￿rms are free to become multinationals we must have
vN = vM (23)
Similarly, the lifetime value of a Southern producer (i.e. the reward






Since vN = vM, we have
￿M














The last two equations de￿ne the Northern relative wage as a function of the











As is clear, the relative wage in the North increases with the production dis-
advantage faced by Northern multinationals (￿) as well as with the Southern
rate of imitation (￿) since both of these factors encourage Northern ￿rms to
produce in the North (thereby increasing the relative demand for Northern









i.e. the larger the share of Southern production that is done by multination-
als, the lower the relative wage in the North. This endogenous adjustment
of relative wage implies that as the extent of Northern FDI increases, the
incentive for further FDI is reduced.
2.1.4 Free Entry
Free entry into innovation implies that the value of Northern ￿rm must











where aN is the unit labor requirement in innovation. The above formula-
tion assumes that the cost of innovation falls with the number of products
(n) that have been invented. In other words, knowledge spillovers from
innovation sustain further innovation. This assumption is standard in the
9literature (see Grossman and Helpman, 1991a and b, and Romer, 1990) and
in its absence growth cannot be sustained in the variety expansion model
with ￿xed resources. The ￿ ow pro￿t of a successful innovator declines with
the number of products invented and incentives for innovation disappear in
the long run if the cost of innovation does not fall with an increase in the
number of products.





Let the unit labor requirement in imitation be aI and the cost function





where nS = nI+nM denotes the number of products produced in the South.
The above cost function for imitation assumes that the cost of imitation
declines with the number of goods produced in the South ￿i.e. both im-
itation and FDI generate knowledge spillovers for the South. The cost of
imitation must decline over time in order to sustain imitation in the long
run because as the number of products in the world economy expand, the
￿ ow pro￿t of a successful imitator falls.



















nS(￿ ￿ 1)￿￿" (34)
























(￿ ￿ 1)xS = 1 (36)
















Substituting from (19) and (20) gives us our ￿rst equilibrium condition



























Intuitively, this condition follows from the assumption of free entry into
imitation and innovation and it ensures that neither activity leads to excess
pro￿ts for ￿rms that are successful in these activities.
2.1.5 Resource Constraints
The other two equilibrium conditions are derived from the resource con-





n + nNxN = LN (39)
Substituting into the above resource constraint from equations (19), (20),












Southern labor is allocated to imitation and production by multination-




nI + ￿nMxM + nIxS = LS (41)
Substituting into the above resource constraint from equations (19), (20),














112.1.6 E⁄ects of Southern IPR reform
Equations (38), (40) and (42) de￿ne the steady state equilibrium of the
model in terms of the three endogenous variables: the rate of innovation
g, the rate of imitation ￿, and the rate of FDI ￿. An important objective
of this paper is to understand how a strengthening of IPR protection in
the South (as measured by an increase in the cost of imitation aI) alters
the distribution of production across the two regions as well as between
Northern multinationals and Southern imitators.
Using the derivations in sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 it is straightforward to
show that the total value of multinational sales relative to those of Southern





Thus, all else equal, factors that lower the Southern rate of imitation (￿)
or those that increase the Northern rate of innovation (g) will lead to an















￿ + g + ￿
￿
(44)
In other words, all else equal, factors that increase the ￿ ow of FDI (￿) or
the Northern rate of innovation (g) as well as those that lower the Southern
rate of imitation (￿) will increase the value of multinational sales relative to
those of Northern ￿rms.
Assuming the rate of imitation ￿ is exogenously given, Lai (1998) has
shown that a strengthening of Southern IPR protection (i.e. a decline in
￿) increases Northern innovation (g) and the rate of production shifting to
the South.5 Here, we address the question of whether the above result holds
when imitation is endogenous and the underlying exogenous variable is the
cost of imitation aI. To do so, we ￿rst solve equation (38) for FDI ￿ ow ￿ in
terms of the other two endogenous variables (g and ￿) and then use the two
resource constraints to derive a system of two equations in two unknowns
which can be illustrated graphically. From equation (38) we have
￿(￿;g) =
A(￿;g)[1 ￿ ￿]aIg2
(￿ + g)[B(￿)aN(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ A(￿;g)aI(1 ￿ ￿)]
(45)





￿ + g + ￿
￿ 1
￿
< 1 < B(￿) = ￿
￿
￿￿1 (46)
It is worth noting that, holding constant the rates of imitation (￿) and





A(￿;g)B(￿)(1 ￿ ￿)aNg2(￿ ￿ 1)
(￿ + g)[B(￿)aN(￿ ￿ 1) ￿ A(￿;g)aI(1 ￿ ￿)]
2 > 0 (47)
The intuition for this result comes from equation (37) which requires the
rate of return on innovation and imitation to equal each other. Since the
right hand side of this equation always equals 1, an increase in aI must be
counterbalanced by an increase in the ratio of production (nS
n ) that occurs
in the South. Otherwise the cost of imitation would increase relative to
the cost of innovation (the cost of imitation in the South is assumed to be















i.e. holding ￿ and g constant, an increase aI can increase the share of goods
produced in the South (nS
n ) only if it implies a higher in￿ ow of FDI (￿) into
the South.
Next, note from (41) that the Southern labor market constraint is inde-
pendent of ￿(￿;g). Substituting for ￿(￿;g) into the Northern labor market
constraint gives us two equations in two unknowns. Let LS(￿;g) = LS de-
note the Southern labor market constraint where LS(￿;g) is the left hand





aIg [g￿(B(￿) ￿ 1) + ￿(B(￿) ￿ ￿)]
(￿ + g)2B(￿)(￿ ￿ 1)
> 0 (49)
where we have assumed that B(￿) > ￿. In other words, holding constant
the rate of innovation g, factors that increase the rate of imitation ￿ must
also increase the demand for Southern labor. A similar statement can be






(B(￿)￿(￿￿ ￿ ￿) + ￿(￿￿ + 2g￿ + g2)
￿
(￿ + g)2B(￿)(￿ ￿ 1)
> 0 (50)
13where we have assumed that ￿￿ > ￿.














In other words, since the South has only a ￿xed amount of labor resources,
an increase in the Southern rate of imitation ￿ implies that the rate of






(￿ + ￿ + g)B(￿)(￿ ￿ 1)
> 0 (52)
i.e. the higher the equilibrium rate of imitation ￿, higher the demand for
Northern labor.
While the expression for
@LN(￿;g)
@g is complicated, it has a positive sign
for most reasonable parameter values. Thus, the Northern labor market
constraint is also downward sloping in the (g;￿) space. It is worth noting
the role FDI plays in delivering this result. In the absence of FDI, in a variety
expansion product cycle model such as Grossman and Helpman (1991b), the
Northern market labor constraint is actually upward sloping in the (g;￿)
space. In our model as well as in Lai (1998) and Helpman (1993), since
imitation targets only multinationals, a higher rate of imitation implies that
FDI is less attractive to Northern ￿rms. If more Northern ￿rms refrain
from FDI due to an increase in imitation risk, fewer Northern resources are
available for innovation thereby generating the property that the Northern
labor market constraint is downward sloping.
We may question the assumption that production workers could be easily
redeployed as R&D workers, and this issue warrants further discussion. In
keeping with the prior stream of theoretical research, we have constructed a
model in which labor is the only factor of production. What we really seek to
model in this one-factor context, however, is the essence of a more complex
process by which multinationals are able to realize cost savings by shifting
manufacturing abroad, and then invest some of the resources saved in higher
levels of R&D. In an industry case study, McKendrick et al. (2000) describe
how U.S.-based hard disk drive manufacturers adopted precisely this strat-
egy, using the resources saved through a shift of manufacturing to Asia to
engage in more innovative activities than their global rivals. Throughout
the period under study, U.S.-based ￿rms retained their leadership of global
market share. Manufacturing shifted almost entirely o⁄shore and high-level
14R&D and other "headquarters services" functions remained concentrated in
the U.S. The experience of the hard disk drive industry does not appear
to be unique. At the aggregate level, the U.S. steadily lost manufacturing
jobs throughout the 1990s, but productivity growth accelerated, patenting
by U.S. ￿rms increased sharply, and measures of R&D intensity rose. And
while we observe relatively few assembly-line workers going directly into
high-level R&D jobs, over time the U.S. workforce has employed a steadily
smaller fraction in assembly-line jobs and a steadily higher fraction in jobs
related to R&D, broadly de￿ned. Thus, in a broader sense the kind of re-
source reallocation we seek to model does appear to be taking place. We
will return to these issues later in the paper.
For now, we consider how an increase in the cost of imitation impacts
both of the labor market constraints, as represented in the paper. From
equation (42) it is immediate that holding constant the rates of imitation
and growth (i.e. ￿ and g), an increase in the labor requirement in imitation
(aI) increases labor demand in the South in all three activities (i.e. local
imitation, production by Southern ￿rms, and production by multinationals).
This is equivalent to an inward shift in the Southern labor market constraint
in the (g;￿) space.
From equation (40) we note that holding constant g and ￿, an increase
in aI e⁄ects the Northern labor market constraint via its e⁄ect on the rate
of FDI ￿. Given that the ￿ ow of FDI ￿ increases in aI (see equation 47), it
follows that labor demand in the North LN(￿;g) (i.e. the left hand side of
equation 40) decreases with an increase in aI.
The e⁄ect of a strengthening of IPR protection in the South on equi-
librium rates of imitation and innovation is shown in Figure 1. With an
increase in the cost of imitation (i.e. aI), the Southern labor market con-
straint shifts down while the Northern constraint shifts up. As a result, the
rate of innovation g increases while the rate of imitation ￿ decreases.6
To gain some insight into the degree to which a change in Southern
IPR protection a⁄ects the allocation of production across the two regions as
well as the relative wage, we conducted numerical simulations. Consistent
with Figure 1, these simulations show that as IPR protection in the South is
strengthened, the rate of imitation goes down whereas the rate of innovation
and FDI both increase. As a result, the measure of goods produced by
Northern multinationals (nM) increases, the measure of imitated products
6The following parameters were used to generate Figure 1: L
S = 150; L
N = 200;
aN = 1; ￿ = 1=100; ￿ = 1:3; and ￿ = 1=2. The cost of imitation aI parameter is increased
from 0.5 to 0.55.
15(nI) decreases, while the total measure (nS) of Southern products increases.
Table 1a below reports the results of one such typical simulation (assuming
the following parameter values: LS = 150; LN = 200; aN = 1; ￿ = 1=100;
￿ = 1:3; and ￿ = 1=2).7








0.5 8% 45% 2.90
0.55 14% 55% 2.35
0.60 21% 64% 2.02
0.65 28% 72% 1.79
0.70 37% 80% 1.63
The intuition underlying the results shown in Table 1a (as well as those
in Figure 1) is as follows: A strengthening of Southern IPR protection makes
imitation less attractive, thereby lowering the rate of imitation ￿. A lower
risk of imitation makes FDI in the South more attractive to Northern ￿rms
who respond by increasing the rate of FDI (￿) which translates into a higher
share of FDI in Southern production (nM
nS ). Also, note that as Southern IPR
is strengthened, the South ends up producing a greater percentage of the
world￿ s basket of goods (nS
n ). This occurs even though the share of imitated
goods as a percentage of total Southern production ( nI
nS) shrinks because the
increase in FDI o⁄sets the decline in imitation.
Whereas Helpman (1993) found that stronger IPR retards Southern in-
dustrial development, we ￿nd that stronger IPR enhances it, at least in
theory. In Table 1a, a 40% increase in the cost of imitation causes the
South￿ s share of total manufacturing to more than quadruple. Due to the
FDI response, the growth in Southern production is also faster than in a
weak IPR equilibrium. In addition, stronger IPR raises the relative wage
of Southern workers.8 In Table 1a, a 40% increase in the costs of imitation
shrinks the North-South wage gap by nearly 44%. By shifting production in
favor of multinationals, it lowers prices of goods previously produced in the
North, and enhances the e¢ ciency of global production. Finally, by freeing
up additional resources in the North, stronger IPR in the South increases
the rate of Northern innovation, bene￿tting both regions. Over time, more
goods are available to consumers worldwide, and they arrive at a faster rate.
7Tables 1b and 1c in the appendix show that the results reported in Table 1 are robust
to variations in ￿.
8In contrast to Helpman (1993), in our model, FDI does not equalize wages in the two
regions ￿see equation (27).
16On the other hand, these bene￿ts do come at a cost. By increasing produc-
tion by multinationals while reducing that by Southern imitators, stronger
IPR in the South can lead to higher prices on some goods for consumers in
both regions. The precise magnitude of this countervailing price e⁄ect is
di¢ cult to determine in the context of our current model. For this reason,
we stop short of a full-￿ edged welfare analysis, leaving this for future work.
We now turn to our empirical analysis.
3 Empirical Analysis of IPR Reform
The theory developed in Section 2 shows how stronger IPR can enhance
the industrial development of developing countries, through the channel of
multinational production shifting. Three predictions that follow from the
theory can be tested empirically. First, according to the theory, multina-
tional ￿rms respond to reforms by increasing production in reforming coun-
tries. Second, growth in production by multinationals and local ￿rms that
are not engaging in imitation exceeds the decline in any imitative activity
that was occurring prior to reform. Finally, the pace at which multination-
als introduce the production of new products to their a¢ liates accelerates
following reform.
In the tests that follow, we analyze the e⁄ects of well-documented dis-
crete changes in patent regimes over the 1980s and 1990s in sixteen coun-
tries. We use the regime changes of Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley (2006),
which assembles a comprehensive list of substantive IPR reforms based on
a number of primary and secondary sources. Limiting the set of regime
changes to those with su¢ cient multinational activity yields a ￿nal sample
of 16 reforms, which are listed in Table 2.9 As in Branstetter, Fisman,
and Foley (2006), we assume that the precise timing of the regime changes
is exogenous to the activities of the individual ￿rms.10 The approach of
analyzing responsiveness to discrete and well-de￿ned changes has a number
of advantages. It allows for the use of ￿xed e⁄ects that control for fea-
9A detailed discussion of the particulars of these sixteen reform episodes is provided
by Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley (2006) and the accompanying Data Appendix. Both
documents can be downloaded from http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/branstet. Multinational
managers have questioned the e⁄ectiveness of enforcement of the patent reforms instituted
in Argentina and China. We therefore take steps to ensure that our results are robust to
the removal of these countries from the sample.
10Branstetter, Fisman, and Foley (2006) provide detailed historical and econometric ev-
idence suggesting that the exact timing of patent reform is likely to be plausibly exogenous
to the activities of our sample ￿rms. See pages 342-347.
17tures of the business environment in a country that are correlated with the
strength of IPR. Furthermore, since tests capture the short-term reaction
to strengthening IPR, it is not necessary to create a measure of the level of
IPR strength that accurately and consistently measures this variable over
time and across countries.11
Note that we include patent reforms in Japan in our sample, though it is a
high income country. However, many students of the Japanese economy have
repeatedly pointed to the existence of a dual economy in Japan, with some
Japanese industries achieving extremely high levels of productivity relative
to the U.S. and other industries lagging far behind the U.S. productivity
frontier.12 Given the substantial relative productivity lags that existed in
some sectors, particularly at the beginning of our sample, we incorporate
data from Japan in the empirical analyses described below.
3.1 Multinational Firm Responses
3.1.1 Empirical Speci￿cation
In examining the model￿ s prediction that stronger IPR induces an expansion
of multinational activity, we take a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erences approach. Indi-
vidual a¢ liates are followed through time, and the basic speci￿cation tests
how MNE activity changes around the time of reform. The disaggregated
nature of our data allow us to control for country, parent ￿rm, and a¢ liate
characteristics that might impact the behavioral variables of interest, and
hence obtain estimates that are conceptually close to the measurement of
the marginal impact of an IPR regime shift on these variables. The basic
speci￿cation takes the form:
Silt = ￿0+￿il+￿t+￿0yjt+￿1Pit+￿2Hjt+￿3Rjt+￿4Rjt￿Techil+"it (53)
where l indexes the individual a¢ liate, i the a¢ liate￿ s parent ￿rm, j
the a¢ liate￿ s host country, and t the year. Several measures of the scale of
11Our approach clearly limits our focus to countries in which there has been a reasonable
amount of U.S. FDI activity. While the 16 countries in our sample are quite heterogeneous
in terms of their income, location, and industrial development at the time of reform, we
recognize the need to exercise caution in extrapolating these results to countries outside
the sample.
12See McKinsey Global Institute (2000) and Porter, Takeuchi, and Sakakibara (2000)
for recent examinations of this problem, which has existed for many decades.
18multinational activity serve as dependent variables. In the theory section,
the concept of "scale of multinational activity" is unambiguously de￿ned,
and it corresponds to the number of distinct products for which production
has shifted to the South. While our data on multinational activity are at
the a¢ liate level, they do not include sales data broken down by individual
products. Hence, our data are not su¢ ciently disaggregated to measure
production shifting directly. However, by measuring the response of multi-
national a¢ liates to IPR reform along a number of dimensions, we can look
for evidence of a change in a¢ liate behavior consistent with production shift-
ing, as de￿ned in our theoretical model. To capture indirect evidence of
production shifting, we measure a¢ liate￿ s capital stock, employment com-
pensation, use of technology from the parent ￿rm, and R&D expenditures.
To further sharpen our inference, we allow the nature of an a¢ liate￿ s re-
sponse to patent reform to di⁄er depending on the intensity with which the
parent ￿rm deploys intellectual property in countries that do not undertake
a reform.
The key variables of interest are Rjt, the post reform dummy variable,
and Rjt interacted with a variable, Techil, that re￿ ects the extent to which
parent ￿rms transfer technology to a¢ liates in countries that do not reform
their IPR. Rjt is equal to one in the year of and years following patent reform
in country j. Techil is generated as follows: those a¢ liates of parents
that, over the four years prior to a particular reform, receive at least as
much technology licensing income from their a¢ liates outside the reforming
countries as the parent of the median a¢ liate in the reforming country over
the same period are assigned a high technology transfer dummy, Techil,
equal to one. For other a¢ liates, Techil equals zero. This dummy variable
thus captures the relative propensity of di⁄erent parent ￿rms to both create
intellectual property and deploy it outside the home country. It is intuitive
that ￿rms with a greater dependence on intellectual property should respond
more strongly to IPR reforms, so that ￿4 > 0.
We include a number of controls. ￿il are time-invariant ￿xed e⁄ects
for the a¢ liate, ￿t are year ￿xed e⁄ects for the entire sample, and yjt are
country-speci￿c time trends. Pit and Hjt are vectors of time-varying parent
and host country characteristics respectively. We control for the total sales
of the parent system as well as the level of parent ￿rm R&D spending. Host
country characteristics include per capita GDP, measures of trade and FDI
openness, real exchange rates and corporate tax rates. We do not view
this basic speci￿cation as a structural production function (or investment
equation) in any sense, nor do we impute structural interpretations to any
of the regression parameters generated by such a speci￿cation.
19In seeking to measure changes in the scale of multinational operations
after IPR reform, we note that use of what is perhaps the most obvious mea-
sure ￿sales ￿presents serious problems of inference. Because a strengthen-
ing of IPR raises the e⁄ective monopoly power of patent holders, it is likely
to increase the pricing power of foreign multinationals. If multinational
a¢ liates increase sales after IPR reform ￿and we do ￿nd evidence of a post-
reform sales increase on the order of 17% ￿this could indicate an increase
in production shifting. However, it could just as easily re￿ ect the fact that
a¢ liates exploit the increased monopoly power conferred on them through
IPR reform by charging higher markups on an unchanged set of products. In
the absence of ￿rm-speci￿c price indices, we would be unable to rule out this
alternative explanation. Therefore, our analysis of ￿rm-level data will em-
phasize the use of measures of inputs to the production process rather than
measures of output. If there is at least a group of ￿rms that substantially
increases their capital stock after IPR reform, this would be consistent with
an expansion of a¢ liate activity along the dimensions stressed by the theory.
We might also expect to see an increase in the utilization of labor. In our
theory, in which labor is the only factor, this would be a natural implication.
In practice, production shifting of more technologically sophisticated goods
might have a relatively modest e⁄ect on the overall size of the workforce and
much more of an impact on its composition; the ￿rm might change the skill
mix of its a¢ liate workforce, hiring more managers and engineers. While
we do not have direct measures of skill mix, we do have measures of total
employment compensation, which would re￿ ect a shift in the composition
of the labor force toward higher-skilled (and higher-paid) workers.
In a similar manner, the inception of production of more sophisticated
products would be likely to require an increase in the use of the parent ￿rm￿ s
technology. Following Branstetter, Foley, and Fisman (2006), we can use
a¢ liate level data on the volume of intra￿rm royalty payments for intangi-
ble assets to track changes in the licensing of technology from the parent.13
If IPR reform induces ￿rms to shift production of more technologically in-
tensive products to a¢ liates in reforming countries, we would expect to see
those payments increase relative to a¢ liate sales. Finally, the inception of
production of more technologically intensive products should be associated
with an increase in a¢ liate level R&D spending. There is a considerable
body of work that details the relationship between a¢ liate and parent-￿rm
13Our earlier paper describes at length the nature of these data and the issues that arise
in using them as indicators of technology transfer. See pages 328-330 of Branstetter,
Fisman, and Foley (2006) for details.
20R&D. While U.S.-based multinationals undertake basic and applied re-
search abroad, the R&D conducted by a¢ liates in developing countries,
which account for most of the countries in our sample, is focused on the
modi￿cation of parent ￿rm technology for local markets (see, for example,
Kummerle, 1999). Thus, a¢ liate R&D and technology transfers from the
parent should be considered complements so that IPR reform should also
generate an increase in R&D spending.
3.1.2 Data
Data on U.S. multinational ￿rms comes from the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) annual Survey of U.S. Direct Investment Abroad and the
quarterly Balance of Payments Survey. The survey forms concerning MNE
activity capture extensive information on measures of parent and a¢ liate
operating activity like levels of sales, employment compensation, capital,
and R&D expenditures. MNEs must also report the value of royalties paid
by a¢ liates to parents for the sale or use of intangible property. American
tax law requires that foreign a¢ liates make these payments. The reported
￿gures on the value of intangible property transferred include an amalgam of
technology licensing fees, franchise fees, fees for the use of trademarks, etc.
However, the aggregate data indicate that intangible property transfers are
overwhelmingly dominated by licensing of technology for industrial products
and processes. The top panel of Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for
the data used in our analysis of U.S. multinational ￿rms. In order to obtain
information on parent ￿rm R&D expenditures in years in which this item
was not captured in BEA surveys, the BEA data on publicly traded parents
is linked to COMPUSTAT using employee identi￿cation numbers.
3.1.3 Results
Table 4 presents the results of speci￿cations based on equation (53) that
test if a¢ liates expand their operations at the time of reform. As noted
above, our tests focus on measures of input to a¢ liate production, because
of the di¢ culties in interpreting changes in measured sales. The dependent
variable in column 1 is the log of the level of a¢ liate assets. The 0.1114
coe¢ cient on the IPR Reform dummy indicates that a¢ liates of U.S. MNEs
expand their capital stock at the time of reform. Since the dependent
variable is measured in logs, these coe¢ cients have a semi-elasticity inter-
pretation, implying that these a¢ liates increase their capital stock by about
2111% following reforms. The IPR Reform dummy interacted with the High
Technology Transfer dummy is positive and statistically signi￿cant, indicat-
ing that the a¢ liates of parents that extensively deploy intellectual property
in countries that do not reform their IPR expanded their capital stock by
an additional 9%. Thus, in line with our predictions, IPR reforms trigger
increases in a¢ liate assets, and these increases are larger among ￿rms that
are especially likely to value reforms.
The second column of Table 4 presents results of the same speci￿cation,
with the log of physical capital (net PPE) used in place of the log of assets
as the dependent variable. This provides us with an alternative measure of
a¢ liates￿capital stock. The coe¢ cient on the reform dummy is small and
statistically insigni￿cant at conventional levels. However, the coe¢ cient on
the reform dummy interacted with the High Technology Transfer dummy is
large and statistically signi￿cant. This result implies that a¢ liates of ￿rms
that transfer technology abroad extensively increase their stock of physical
capital by nearly 19% more than other a¢ liates following reform.
The third column presents estimates of the impact of reform on employ-
ment compensation. The coe¢ cient on the reform dummy is positive and
statistically signi￿cant, suggesting a roughly 12% increase in labor compen-
sation. The coe¢ cient on the interaction term of the reform dummy with
the High Technology Transfer dummy is also positive and statistically sig-
ni￿cant, suggesting a total expansion of around 20% for a¢ liates of ￿rms
that make extensive use of intellectual property.
While the results of the ￿rst three columns all imply an expansion of
multinational activity in the wake of patent reform, they do not necessarily
imply an acceleration in the rate at which the production of new goods is
transferred to the South. However, the production of new goods is likely to
require new technology from the parent ￿rm, and to examine this hypoth-
esis, we analyze royalties paid by a¢ liates to parents for the sale or use of
intangible assets. Because larger a¢ liate sales volumes may automatically
result in higher levels of royalty payments back to the parent, we use the
log of the royalty to sales ratio. For expositional purposes, we multiply this
value by 100 in our reported results. Results similar to those on royalty
payments and R&D expenditure were previously reported in Branstetter,
Fisman, and Foley (2006) in empirical work that focused speci￿cally on this
component of ￿rms￿reaction to IPR reforms. We provide royalty results
in column 4 of Table 4. The coe¢ cient on the reform dummy is actually
negative and, at conventional levels, statistically signi￿cant. However, the
coe¢ cient on the interaction term is positive, highly signi￿cant, and large in
magnitude. For the a¢ liates of ￿rms that are more dependent on the use of
22parent technology abroad, royalty payments appear to increasing substan-
tially. Increased licensing payments, cumulated over several years, would
imply a substantial increase in the technological intensity of activity under-
taken by these a¢ liates. Alternative speci￿cations using the level of royalty
payments as the dependent variable produced qualitatively similar results.
Column 5 shows the results of a speci￿cation using a¢ liate R&D spend-
ing. While most R&D spending by U.S.-based multinational ￿rms is con-
centrated in the U.S., some foreign a¢ liates have substantial R&D expendi-
tures. As noted above, the vast majority of this R&D spending is designed to
modify the parent ￿rm￿ s technology to local circumstances and conditions.
It can thus be seen as a complement to technology imports from the parent.
If the post-reform increase in technology licensing payments identi￿ed in
column 4 truly represents the deployment of new technology (rather than
simply an increase in the price of technology), then we would expect that
increase to be mirrored by an increase in a¢ liate R&D spending. In column
5 of Table 4, we show results of a speci￿cation using the log of a¢ liate R&D
expenditure divided by a¢ liate sales as the dependent variable (as in column
4 we multiply the log of the ratio by 100 for expositional purposes). The
coe¢ cient on the reform dummy is small and statistically indistinguishable
from zero at conventional levels. However, the interaction of the reform and
High Technology Transfer dummy is positive and statistically signi￿cant; for
a¢ liates of parents that are likely to especially value strong IPR, there is a
signi￿cant post reform increase in a¢ liate R&D. Alternative speci￿cations
using the log of R&D spending generated qualitatively similar results.
As noted previously, while IPR-strengthening legislation was enacted in
Argentina and China in the 1990s, multinational managers have repeatedly
called into question the e⁄ectiveness of enforcement of reform in these two
countries. We therefore repeated the speci￿cations shown in Table 4 with a
restricted sample that excluded Argentina and China. We obtained results
qualitatively similar to those shown here.14 Because Japan di⁄ers in impor-
tant ways from the other countries that undertook signi￿cant IPR reforms,
we dropped Japan from the sample. Our results were not qualitatively af-
fected by this. Our results were also robust to the inclusion of region-year
￿xed e⁄ects. Concerns that measurement of the High Technology Trans-
fer dummy might cause it to proxy for ￿rm size led us to incorporate an
interaction term of ￿rm size and patent reform. This did not a⁄ect our
14These results are available from the authors upon request. The only speci￿cations
that were sensitive to the exclusion of Argentina and China were those that employed the
log of the R&D/Sales ratio as the dependent variable.
23results.
Taken together, these results strongly suggest a pattern of responses to
IPR reform that is consistent with the kind of production shifting empha-
sized in our theoretical model. While the results of any one speci￿cation are
subject to multiple interpretations, our collective results suggest the mech-
anism sketched out by our theoretical model is operative in the real world
generating our data. Is this positive e⁄ect su¢ ciently strong to have a
positive e⁄ect overall on industrial development in reforming countries? To
better get at this issue, we turn to industry-level data from the reforming
countries.
3.2 Industry-Level Output Responses
While the preceding results have the advantage of showing the e⁄ects of IPR
reform on U.S. multinational activity using highly disaggregated data, these
analyses do not indicate the consequences of reform for multinationals from
other countries or for local ￿rms. Our model predicts an overall increase in
industrial production, as Southern industrial development accelerates and
the share of global manufacturing in the South rises. We should observe
su¢ ciently high growth in activity by MNEs and local ￿rms that are not
engaged in imitation to o⁄set any decline in activity among local imitators.
While we cannot examine these predictions with ￿rm-level data, it is pos-
sible to analyze broad economic changes using industry-wide measures of
production in reforming countries.
3.2.1 Empirical Approach and Data
We examine the impact of IPR reform on industrial output and value added
using a speci￿cation similar to that employed in the previous section:
V Aijt = ￿0+￿ij +￿t+￿0yjt+￿1Hjt+￿2Rjt+￿3Rjt￿IndTechi+"it (54)
where V A measures value added in industry i in country j in year t. The
controls include country-industry pair ￿xed e⁄ects, time dummy variables,
host country-speci￿c linear time trends, and a vector of time-varying char-
acteristics of country j; including the log of per capita income, the tax rate,
the real exchange rate, and the measures of FDI and trade openness used
in earlier speci￿cations. The primary variable of interest is Rjt, the post
reform dummy. In some speci￿cations we allow the impact of IPR reform to
24di⁄er according to the importance of technological innovation for ￿rms (both
multinational and domestic) by interacting Rjt with an industry-level mea-
sure of technology intensity. We set the Technology Intensive dummy equal
to one for the following industries: electrical machinery, industrial chemicals,
other chemicals, professional and scienti￿c equipment, and transportation
equipment. As an alternative approach, we also generate an industry-level
measure of FDI intensity by looking at the cross-industry distribution of U.S.
FDI in countries where intellectual property is well protected throughout
our sample. The intuition is that these are the sectors where multinationals
would naturally choose to invest abroad. We generate a dummy variable
that denotes industries that had above median a¢ liate sales in this set of
high IPR countries. If the impact of reform is particularly strong in these
sectors, we expect a positive coe¢ cient on the interaction of this measure of
IPR importance with our post-reform dummy variable.15
Data are drawn from the United Nations Industrial Development Orga-
nization (UNIDO) database, which provides measures of value added at the
ISIC 3-digit level in a common format for a large number of member states.
While data are not available on all ISIC 3-digit industries for all reforming
countries in all years, there is reasonably complete coverage for most coun-
tries in most years. Data incorporate the activity of multinational a¢ liates
as well as domestic ￿rms. Descriptive statistics for the data used in our
industry level value added regressions are provided in the middle panel of
Table 3.
3.2.2 Results
Table 5 reports results from speci￿cation (54) on industry level value added
measures obtained from the UNIDO 3-digit industry-level database. The
positive coe¢ cient on the reform dummy in the ￿rst column implies that
growth in value added accelerates after patent reform, but this e⁄ect is not
statistically signi￿cant at conventional levels. Column two reports a spec-
i￿cation that includes the interaction of the reform dummy and the Tech-
nology Intensive dummy. The interaction term is positive and statistically
signi￿cant, implying that the output expansion suggested by the results in
column one is concentrated in technology intensive industries. This argues
15We use the Ginarte and Park (1997) index to identify countries that had a high G-P
index of IPR strength in 1980, which precedes our sample. We then identify the BEA
sectors in which FDI is particularly concentrated, and use a concordance of BEA-ISIC
industries to identify the corresponding ISIC industries.
25against the view that IPR reform induces a collapse of indigenous industrial
activity that more than o⁄sets MNC expansion. Rather, the point estimate
implies an expansion of industry level value added, relative to the underly-
ing trend, of more than 11%. Results from column 3, in which reform is
interacted with a dummy variable that identi￿es the industries in which U.S.
FDI is concentrated worldwide, further bolsters this view. Again, we ￿nd
that the interaction term is positive and statistically signi￿cant. As in our
earlier results, we repeat our analyses dropping China and Argentina from
the analyses, and obtain qualitatively similar results (see columns 4-6).
3.3 Initial Export Episodes
Interpreted literally, our model￿ s predictions center on the inception of pro-
duction of new goods following reform. Measures of a¢ liate or indus-
try activity analyzed above are not su¢ ciently disaggregated to permit the
tracking of a¢ liate activity at the individual product level. Therefore, to
capture more directly the extent of new production initiation in reforming
countries, we use an approach inspired by Feenstra and Rose (2000).
This approach requires the use of disaggregated U.S. import statistics to
obtain counts of initial export episodes. Speci￿cally, we use the number of
10-digit commodities for which recorded U.S. imports from a given country
exceed zero for the ￿rst time. This approach is imperfect in that domes-
tic production may precede exports by several years, but in the Helpman
framework and its descendents, a strengthening of IPR in the South impacts
the global economy through Southern exports. Furthermore, since the U.S.
is the world￿ s single biggest market for many commodities, looking at the
date at which a particular country starts exporting a particular good to the
U.S. may be a reasonable indicator of production shifting for that good. The
speci￿c question we will examine is whether the rate of production shifting,
thus measured, is more rapid after patent reform, as predicted by our model.
The notion of "production shifting" implies the initiation of production
in developing countries and the cessation of production in developed coun-
tries. Unfortunately, our multinational production data are not su¢ ciently
disaggregated for us to identify the cessation of production of a particular
good by our multinational parent ￿rms, and the aggregation problems are
even more severe in the publicly available U.S. industrial output statistics.
Because of these data constraints, we are only able to examine one side of
production shifting.16
16Note, however, there is evidence that the expected cessation of production of certain
263.3.1 Empirical Approach and Data
Our dependent variable P is a count variable that measures, for a given
country j in a given year t, the number of 10-digit commodities that were
exported to the U.S. for the ￿rst time. Intuitively, this is a proxy for the ar-
rival rate of new products. This count is regressed on country-year variables
that control for a country￿ s changing export capabilities using a speci￿cation
that includes country dummy variables, time dummy variables, a vector of
time-varying characteristics of country j, and the reform dummy variable:
Pjt = ￿0 + ￿j + ￿t + ￿0Hjt + ￿1Rjt + "it (55)
The country characteristics are the same as those used in the previous ta-
ble.17 A positive coe¢ cient on the reform dummy would indicate that re-
forms spur the rate at which new products are produced in reforming coun-
tries, indicating an acceleration in the pace of industrial development in
reforming countries. Following the logic traced out by Helpman (1993)
and Lai (1998), this would imply that additional resources are freed up in
developed countries with strong IPR allowing an acceleration in the rate of
Northern innovation and, in turn, an increase in the range of goods available
to consumers in all countries.
We use data from the U.S. trade database created by Feenstra, Romalis,
and Schott (2001). Annual data on U.S. imports from nearly all coun-
tries worldwide are available at the 10-digit level of disaggregation, which
is very close to the individual product level. One di¢ culty in using these
data is that the 10-digit commodity classi￿cation system was extensively re-
vised in 1989. As a consequence, data before and after the revision are not
comparable at the most disaggregated level. The data do come with a cor-
respondence that allows one to link the 1970s-era classi￿cation to the later
goods in the U.S. is taking place. A recent study by Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2006)
uses con￿dential plant-level data from the LRD to show that cessation of production of
certain goods is occurring at a fairly rapid rate within U.S.-based manufacturing plants.
These authors document a shift to the production of more capital- and skill-intensive
goods (that is, more sophisticated goods) for surviving plants, consistent with the evolving
comparative advantage of U.S. manufacturers. Plants that do not shift their product mix
in this way are less likely to survive. These patterns are broadly consistent with the view
of "production shifting" presented in Section 2.
17Unlike the industrial output data, these data do not exhibit any clear upward trend
over time ￿this is unsurprising, given that we are looking at new export categories in a
given year; hence, there is less need to include country-speci￿c time trends.
27harmonized system, but this mapping is neither unique nor exact. Most
attempts to link the pre- and post-revision data are done at a much higher
level of aggregation ￿but going up to the 5-digit or 4-digit level would mask
many of the new product introductions that we are trying to measure. We
therefore focus on the post-1988 years for which our data are measured con-
sistently.18 Descriptive statistics for the data employed in our analysis are
provided in the bottom panel of Table 3.19 As in our earlier speci￿cations,
we can examine whether the estimated impact of IPR reform is stronger
in technology intensive product categories. This is done by limiting our
analysis to HS 10-digit product categories that can be associated with the
ISIC codes identi￿ed in the previous section as being technology intensive:
electrical machinery, industrial chemicals, other chemicals, professional and
scienti￿c equipment, and transportation equipment. For all country-year
observations, we create separate counts of initial export episodes arising
in only these product categories. We refer to these product categories as
"tech goods" and use this term to designate regression results based on this
subsample of the data.
3.3.2 Results
Table 6 provides results from regressions that take the form of equation
(55). The dependent variable measures the count of initial export episodes
at the 10-digit level. In column 1 we provide results using the Poisson ￿xed
e⁄ects regression model derived by Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984) that
accounts for the count nature of the dependent variable. In this speci￿cation,
we use data on initial export episodes in all product categories and in all
reforming countries. The coe¢ cient on the IPR Reform dummy is positive
and signi￿cant, and implies an increase in the arrival rate of new goods on
the order of 21%.
In column 2, we continue to employ a Poisson ￿xed e⁄ects model, but
limit the sample to product classes associated with technology intensive
industries. If the post-reform acceleration in production-shifting is driven,
18We note that results obtained using data from 1982-1999 are qualitatively similar to
those reported here. Because of the signi￿cant reclassi￿cation of data in 1989, however,
the dependent variable is not measured consistently in this broader sample.
19These data contain some observations that record extremely small trade ￿ ows, often
followed by no activity. Concerned that these anomalous observations might bias upward
the counts of initial export episodes, we report results obtained when we drop these
questionable observations, though we obtain qualitatively similar results with the full
data set.
28at least in part, by the reaction of multinationals to stronger IPR, then we
would expect to see e⁄ects in this subsample that are at least as large as
those obtained from the whole sample. When we do so, we obtain an e⁄ect
that is positive and statistically signi￿cant. The point estimate is slightly
larger in magnitude than that in column 1. As in previous regressions,
we repeat the analyses excluding Argentina and China, and obtain similar
results (columns 3 and 4). Finally, following Hausman, Hall, and Griliches
(1984), we also employ their ￿xed e⁄ects negative binomial model as an
alternative speci￿cation and obtain similar results to those derived from the
Poisson model (columns 5-8).
4 Conclusion
The strengthening of IPR in the developing world remains controversial.
Sharp disagreements persist over the impact of this shift on developing na-
tions. Unfortunately, the economics literature to date has shed relatively lit-
tle light on this debate, despite the best e⁄orts of many talented researchers.
The theoretical literature initiated by Helpman (1993) has shown that
the ultimate e⁄ect of IPR reforms in the South on the global economy
hinges on the manner and the extent of the multinational response to them.
If multinationals respond to stronger IPR by shifting production to their
Southern a¢ liates, this could more than compensate for a decline in South-
ern imitation. In general, the literature based on Helpman￿ s model has
shown that, where stronger IPR in the South leads to an acceleration of
production-shifting, it tends to lead to faster industrial development in the
South, a greater degree of North-South wage convergence, and higher rates
of innovation in the North. The theoretical model we present in this paper
shows that these results hold when Northern innovation, Southern imitation,
and FDI are all endogenous.
These theoretical results open up an opportunity for empirical work to
clarify the nature of the impact of stronger IPR in the South on the extent
and pace of industrial development in the South. We present in this paper a
mix of evidence drawn from data on the activities of U.S. multinational af-
￿liates, industry-level data from reforming countries, and U.S. import data.
All of the evidence indicates that stronger IPR in the South accelerates the
rate at which multinational production is transferred to Southern countries.
We ￿nd that discrete IPR regime changes in sixteen countries leads to an
29expansion of multinational activity in those countries along multiple dimen-
sions, and we argue that this is consistent with parent ￿rms deploying new
technology to their a¢ liates so that these a¢ liates can begin the manufac-
ture of new, more sophisticated goods.
In principle, the increase in production-shifting through multinational
￿rms could crowd out imitative activity by indigenous Southern producers,
with ambiguous e⁄ects on the total amount of production shifting. Evi-
dence from industry-level value-added data and from highly disaggregated
U.S. trade data strongly suggest that this does not occur. Rather, data
measuring levels of industry activity and initial export episodes of tradable
goods suggests that the increase in production-shifting through multina-
tionals more than compensates for any deceleration in production-shifting
through imitation. Analyses of changes in industrial activity after reform
also indicate that aggregate value added at the ISIC 3-digit industry level
especially expands in the technology intensive industries likely to be dis-
proportionately a⁄ected by reform. Stronger IPR in the South appears to
lead to an acceleration of production-shifting, enhancing Southern industrial
development.
Over the long run, production shifting should free up Northern resources
for investment in innovative activity. In this paper, we do not attempt to
estimate the magnitude or timing of this longer run, general equilibrium
e⁄ect. However, other researchers have noted a robust expansion of U.S.
innovative activity in the 1990s, even as manufacturing jobs have continued
to move o⁄shore. Relative to inventors based in other countries, those based
in the U.S. appear to have increased their generation of new ideas.20 Along
with this surge in innovative outcomes has come an acceleration in total
factor productivity growth ￿an acceleration which has persisted in recent
years.21 These are complex phenomena with multiple causes, and one would
not want to make too much of the broad coincidence in time between the
domestic downsizing and o⁄shoring of American manufacturing and the ac-
celeration of American innovative activity. But these recent developments
are certainly consistent with the kind of general equilibrium resource reallo-
cation stressed in Grossman-Helpman style product cycle models. Exploring
the potential link between production shifting and the apparent acceleration
of innovation in U.S. industry in a more systematic way at the industry and
￿rm level is a focus of ongoing research.
20See Kortum and Lerner (1999) for a discussion of evidence based on patent data.
21See Gordon (2003) and the studies cited therein.
305 Appendix
In this appendix, we discuss the relationship of our model to Lai (1998)
and also show that the numerical results reported in Table 1a are robust to
variations in ￿:
5.1 Relationship of model to Lai (1998):
Our model di⁄ers from Lai￿ s in two main ways. First, and most importantly,
imitation is endogenous in our model whereas it is exogenous in his model.





as the rate of multinationalization. However, ￿ measures an expansion in the
Southern production base that results both from multinationals as well as
local imitation. Strictly speaking, only products made by Northern multi-
nationals ought to count as those that have been multinationalized. The
other products made in the South are those that have been imitated by
Southern ￿rms and whose production can longer be controlled by Northern
￿rms. In our terminology, only those goods that are produced by Northern
multinationals are viewed as being multinationalized and the rate of FDI is




Setting ￿ = 1 and assuming ￿ is exogenous simpli￿es our model down to
Lai￿ s. In that case, the two endogenous variables (i.e. g and ￿) must satisfy





















+ 1) = a￿
where




The following result is proved in Lai (1998): a strengthening of Southern IPR
protection (i.e. a decrease in the rate of imitation ￿) increases the Northern
rate of innovation g. The proof proceeds in a straightforward fashion: the




315.2 E⁄ects of variation in ￿
Tables 1b and 1c below show that the e⁄ects of Southern IPR protection on
FDI and the international allocation of production reported in Table 1a are
robust to variations in ￿ (i.e. the parameter that captures the cost disad-
vantage of multinationals relative to local Southern ￿rms). This parameter
is critical because it directly a⁄ects incentives for both FDI and Southern
imitation. All else equal, an increase in ￿ weakens the incentives for FDI
whereas it strengthens the incentives for imitation. In Table 1b ￿ = 1:25
whereas in Table 1c, ￿ = 1:35.22 As can be seen from Tables 1a-1c, the
bigger is ￿, the smaller the extent of FDI and larger the Northern relative
wage. The intuition is that when ￿ is high, imitation is highly attractive
to Southern ￿rms and this acts as a deterrent for FDI which in turn raises
demand for Northern labor (while reducing it for Southern labor). This
change in relative demand for labor translates into a higher relative wage in
the North.








0.5 18% 61% 2.05
0.55 27% 71% 1.77
0.60 38% 79% 1.58
0.65 49% 87% 1.44
0.70 62% 94% 1.33








0.5 4% 32% 3.97
0.55 7% 42% 2.94
0.60 12% 52% 2.41
0.65 17% 61% 2.07
0.70 23% 68% 1.84
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     Figure 1    Effects of Southern IPR Protection 

















This table provides information about the timing of reforms in the countries that strengthen their 
intellectual property rights and are included in the sample.
Timing of Major Patent Reforms
Table 2Descriptive Statistics for Affiliate Analysis Mean St. Dev
Log of Affiliate Assets 10.4941 1.4575
Log of Affiliate Employment Compensation 8.5501 1.5427
Log of Affiliate Net PPE 8.3119 2.6142
100 X Log of Intrafirm Royalty Payments/ Affiliate Sales
0.5365 1.5060
100 X Log of R&D Expenditures/Affiliate Sales 0.3741 1.0702
Host Country Corporate Tax Rate 0.3414 0.1289
Host Country Withholding Tax Rate 0.0831 0.0883
Host Country Inward FDI Restrictions 0.0526 0.2233
Host Country Capital Controls 0.0915 0.2883
Host Country Trade Openness 34.1400 21.2664
Log of Host Country GDP per Capita 8.9012 0.6336
Log of Host Country GDP 26.7154 1.3799
Log of Real Exchange Rate 0.0531 0.2693
Log of Parent R&D Expenditures 10.5503 4.0110
Log of Parent System Sales 15.7507 1.8310
Descriptive Statistics for Industry Analysis Mean St. Dev
Log of Industry Value Added 20.3981 1.9422
Host Country Corporate Tax Rate 0.3048 0.1310
Host Country Inward FDI Restrictions 0.0736 0.2611
Host Country Capital Controls 0.1723 0.3777
Host Country Trade Openness 42.5896 19.9606
Log of Host Country GDP per Capita 8.6352 0.7447
Log of Real Exchange Rate 0.0441 0.2640
Descriptive Statistics for U.S. Import Analysis Mean St. Dev
Count of Initial Export Episodes 608.2804 1009.8990
Count of Initial Export Episodes, "Tech" Goods 105.5661 186.4544
Host Country Corporate Tax Rate 0.2864 0.1160
Host Country Inward FDI Restrictions 0.1124 0.3167
Host Country Capital Controls 0.1067 0.3097
Host Country Trade Openness 48.8617 23.1988
Log of Host Country GDP per Capita 8.8562 0.6320
Log of Real Exchange Rate 0.0442 0.2039
derived from data provided in the World Bank World Development Indicators.  Log of Real Exchange Rate is computed using 
nominal exchange rates and measures of inflation are from the IMF's IFS database.  The Log of Parent System Sales is the log of 
total sales of the parent and its affiliates.  Count of Initial Export Episodes is the count of HS 10 digit product categories in which a 
reforming country exports to the U.S. for the first time in a given year.  Data are taken from the trade data base documented in 
Feenstra, Romalis and Schott (2001).  "Tech" goods refer to the set of 10-digit commodity categories associated with innovation 
intensive 4-digit ISIC industries, specifically industries in ISIC codes 351, 352, 383, 384, and 385.
Table 3
Descriptive Statistics
This table provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis.  The top panel provides such statistics for the analysis 
of affiliate activity, the middle panel for the industry analysis, and the bottom panel for the U.S. import analysis.  Host Country 
Corporate Tax Rate and Host Country Withholding Tax Rate are annual median tax rates paid by affiliates in a host country.  Host 
Country Inward FDI Restrictions and Host Country Capital Controls are dummies equal to one when inward FDI restrictions and 
capital controls exist, and they are drawn from Brune (2004) and Shatz (2000), respectively.  Host Country Trade Openness is the 
index of constant price openness taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002).  The Log of Host Country GDP per capita is Dependent Variable:
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post Reform Dummy 0.1114 0.0245 0.1210 -0.1311 -0.0129
(0.0173) (0.0430) (0.0205) (0.0274) (0.0252)
0.0912 0.1882 0.0790 0.3985 0.0546
(0.0181) (0.0443) (0.0217) (0.0323) (0.0275)
0.1361 0.5099 0.4746 -0.0286 0.2966
(0.0985) (0.2370) (0.1104) (0.1680) (0.1432)
Host Country Withholding Tax Rate 0.3365 0.4473 -0.4565 -0.5657 0.3879
(0.1387) (0.3135) (0.1646) (0.2324) (0.1783)
Host Country Inward FDI Restrictions -0.0601 -0.0971 -0.0483 0.0407 -0.0735
(0.0386) (0.0748) (0.0327) (0.0512) (0.0480)
Host Country Trade Openness 0.0062 0.0071 0.0001 -0.0074 0.0016
(0.0016) (0.0035) (0.0016) (0.0029) (0.0020)
Log of Host Country GDP per Capita 0.3406 0.7166 0.4713 0.6963 0.0196
(0.1518) (0.2908) (0.1900) (0.3193) (0.4135)
Log of Host Country GDP 0.9037 -0.1374 0.6179 -0.0007 -0.0537
(0.1632) (0.3226) (0.1924) (0.3339) (0.4109)
Real Exchange Rate -0.3161 -0.3231 -0.3657 -0.1097 0.0578
(0.0198) (0.0483) (0.0238) (0.0401) (0.0373)
Log of Parent R&D Expenditures 0.0076 0.0315 0.0054 0.0072 0.0072
(0.0035) (0.0089) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0027)
Log of Parent System Sales 0.0467 0.0555 0.0601 0.0058 -0.0015
(0.0088) (0.0143) (0.0093) (0.0092) (0.0039)
No. of Obs. 26,184 22,342 24,844 25,600 16,143
R-Squared 0.8884 0.8377 0.8789 0.6651 0.6645
Post Reform Dummy * High Technology 
Transfer Dummy
Host Country Corporate Tax Rate
Table 4
U.S. Multinational Affiliate Responses to Reform
The dependent variables are the log of affiliate assets in column (1), the log of affiliate net property plant and equipment in column (2), the log of affiliate 
employment compensation in column (3), 100 times the the log of one plus the ratio of intrafirm royalty payments to affiliate sales in column (4), and 100 
times the log of the ratio of one plus the ratio of affiliate research and development expenditures to affiliate sales in column (5).  The Post Reform Dummy 
is a dummy equal to one in the year of reform and in the years following the reforms identified in Table 2.  The High Technology Transfer Dummy is a 
dummy that is equal to one for affiliates of parents that over the four years prior to a reform average total royalty payment receipts from all affiliates that are 
at least as large as the receipts of the parent of the median affiliate in the reforming country.  Host Country Corporate Tax Rate and Host Country 
Withholding Tax Rate are annual median tax rates paid by affiliates in a host country.  Host Country Inward FDI Restrictions and Host Country Capital 
Controls are dummies equal to one when inward FDI restrictions and capital controls exist, and they are drawn from Brune (2004) and Shatz (2000).   
Host Country Trade Openness is the index of constant price openness taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002). The Log of Host Country GDP per 
capita and Log of Host Country GDP are derived from data provided in the World Bank  World Development Indicators (2003).  Log of Real Exchange 
Rate is computed using nominal exchange rates taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002) and measures of inflation from the IMF's IFS database.  The 
Log of Parent System Sales is the log of total sales of the parent and its affiliates.  All specifications include affiliate and year fixed effects as well as 
country-specific time trends.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors appear in parentheses.Dependent Variable:
Sample:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post Reform Dummy 0.0228 0.0023 -0.0172 -0.0024 -0.0221 -0.0355





Host Country Inward FDI Restrictions -0.2262 -0.2260 -0.2178 -0.2171 -0.2166 -0.2132
(0.1007) (0.1010) (0.1093) (0.1009) (0.1012) (0.1094)
Host Country Capital Controls 0.1065 0.1066 0.0820 0.2238 0.2236 0.1982
(0.0333) (0.0334) (0.0340) (0.0332) (0.0333) (0.0335)
Host Country Trade Openness 0.0012 0.0011 0.0003 0.0008 0.0008 -0.0006
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0029)
Log of Host Country GDP per Capita 2.2089 2.2110 2.1203 2.4761 2.4761 2.4205
(0.1494) (0.1491) (0.1557) (0.2010) (0.2005) (0.2135)
Log of Real Exchange Rate -0.3724 -0.3725 -0.3539 -0.4354 -0.4355 -0.4117
(0.0324) (0.0323) (0.0314) (0.0413) (0.0412) (0.0397)
No. of Obs. 6,884 6,884 6,183 6,069 6,069 5,427
R-Squared 0.9593 0.9595 0.9581 0.9584 0.9585 0.9569
All Reforms Drop China and Argentina
Post Reform Dummy * Technology 
Intensive Dummy
Post Reform Dummy * High FDI Dummy
Log of Industry Value Added
Table 5
Impact of Reform on Industry Value Added in Reforming Countries
in the World Bank World Development Indicators. The Log of Real Exchange Rate is computed using nominal exchange rates taken from 
Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002) and measures of inflation from the IMF's IFS database.  All specifications include country/industry and year 
fixed effects as well as country-specific time trends.  Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors appear in parentheses.
The dependent variable is the log of industry value added.   Colums (4)-(6) report results obtained when China and Argentina are dropped from 
the sample.  The Post Reform Dummy is a dummy equal to one in the year of reform and in the years following the reforms identified in Table 2.  
The Technology Intensive Dummy is equal to one for ISIC codes 351, 352, 383, 384, and 385.  The High FDI Dummy is equal to one in 
industries that had above median levels of affiliate sales activity in countries with a 1980 total patent protection index above 3.57 in Ginarte and 
Park (1997).  Host Country Corporate Tax Rate and Host Country Withholding Tax Rate are annual median tax rates paid by affiliates in a host 
country.  Host Country Inward FDI Restrictions and Host Country Capital Controls are dummies equal to one when inward FDI restrictions and 
capital controls exist, and they are drawn from Brune (2004) and Shatz (2000), respectively.  Host Country Trade Openness is the index of 
constant price openness taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002).  The Log of Host Country GDP per capita is derived from data provided Dependent Variable:
Specification Type:
Sample:
Goods Categories All Goods Tech Goods All Goods Tech Goods All Goods Tech Goods All Goods Tech Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post Reform Dummy 0.2120 0.2315 0.2030 0.2823 0.1530 0.2471 0.1481 0.2889
(0.0121) (0.0293) (0.0140) (0.0341) (0.0596) (0.0945) (0.0675) (0.1078)
0.0616 0.1033 -0.0290 0.0968 -0.3055 -1.3105 -0.2415 -0.9800
(0.0794) (0.1914) (0.0960) (0.2311) (0.3742) (0.5540) (0.4725) (0.6814)
Host Country Inward FDI Restrictions -0.0374 0.1710 -0.0010 0.1261 -0.1127 -0.0852 -0.1161 -0.1120
(0.0245) (0.0501) (0.0261) (0.0540) (0.1216) (0.1807) (0.1275) (0.1859)
Host Country Capital Controls -0.1091 -0.1991 -0.0340 -0.0971 -0.1007 -0.0885 -0.1123 -0.1310
(0.0197) (0.0558) (0.0226) (0.0644) (0.0839) (0.1413) (0.0995) (0.1731)
Host Country Trade Openness 0.0123 0.0130 0.0131 0.0114 0.0060 0.0065 0.0087 0.0092
(0.0008) (0.0017) (0.0008) (0.0018) (0.0034) (0.0042) (0.0038) (0.0045)
Log of Host Country GDP per Capita 0.0935 -0.0256 -0.0920 0.2067 -0.0923 0.1427 -0.0155 0.3449
(0.0417) (0.0931) (0.0567) (0.1246) (0.1582) (0.2019) (0.1912) (0.2143)
Log of Real Exchange Rate 0.2477 0.2005 0.3130 0.1435 0.3162 0.1130 0.3449 0.1262
(0.0263) (0.0624) (0.0302) (0.0720) (0.1300) (0.1969) (0.1541) (0.2187)
No. of Obs. 178 178 156 156 178 178 156 156
Log Likelihood -2452 -1194 -2274 -1096 -928 -703 -817 -618
Count of Initial Export Episodes
All Reforms Drop Argentina and China Drop Argentina and China All Reforms
Poisson
Host Country Corporate Tax Rate
Negative Binomial
Table 6
Impact of Reform on Entry into Exports of New Goods
The dependent variable is the count of HS 10 digit product categories in which a reforming country exports to the U.S. for the first time in a given year.  These data are available for the years 1989-2002; we 
limit the sample to 1989-1999 to ensure consistency with our other regressions.  Data are taken from the trade data base documented in Feenstra, Romalis and Schott (2001).  To prevent extremely small trade 
flows from biasing upward our counts of new export episodes, we drop export flows with extremely small (1-2) numbers of physical units.  "Tech goods" restrict the sample to the set of 10-digit commodity 
categories which can be associated with ISIC codes 351, 352, 383, 384, and 385.  Given the issues raised in the text about reforms in Argentina and China, columns (3), (4), (7) and (8) display results generated
after removing these countries from the sample.  The Post Reform Dummy is equal to one in the year of reform and in the years following the reforms listed in Table 2.  Host Country Corporate Tax Rate is the 
annual median tax rate paid by affiliates in a country.  Host Country Inward FDI Restrictions and Host Country Capital Controls are dummy variables drawn from Brune (2004) and Schatz (2000), respectively
Host country Trade Openness is the index of constant price openness taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002).  The Log of Host Country GDP per capital is derived from data provided in the World 
Bank World Development Indicators.  Log of Real Exchange Rate is computed using nominal exchange rates taken from Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002) and measures of inflation from the IMFs IFS 
database.  All specifications include country and year fixed effects.